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Evaluating the Taxation of Risky Assets
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the taxation of risky assets, both from the
theoretical perspective of optimal taxation and from the practical one
of measuring "the" tax rate on an asset when, as under existing practice,
its stochastic returns are subject to differential tax treatment across
states of nature. The results suggest that it may be ttappropriateP? for
tax rates to vary systematically with the riskiness of an asset, but
that use of the expected tax rate to evaluate the characteristics of any






Suppose that two investment projects have the same expected rate of return
after tax but different expected rates before tax. Which project is taxed more
heavily? Is it inefficient for tax burdens to differ, if indeed they do?
While we are accustomed to answering these questions for the certaintycase,
the task of doing so becomes more complicated when there is uncertainty and
investors are risk averse. For a number of reasons, there need be no well—
defined measure of "thea tax rate on an asset, at least not inanysense familar
from the certainty context. First of all, if there does not exist an efficient
pooling of private risks in society, then competitive equilibrium is not F.reto
efficient. In such an environment, taxation can act to mitigate this
externality. As a result, the excess burden of imposing a tax on asset returns
may very well be negative, it may be possible for government to raise a substan-
tial amount of revenue and yet make no asset holder worse off. Thus, in the
sense of resource cost imposed, a tax maynotreally be a tax.
Even if efficient markets for risk exist, each asset is actually a bundle of
state—contingent commodity claims. Unless returns in different states are taxed
uniformly, the tax rate on the entire bundle imistbe calculated using some
weightingscheme for combining these state—contingent tax rates. Oneobvious
candidate,corresponding to thatused implicitly insome empiricalstudies, is
theexpected tx rate, based on probability weights for the different states of
nature.However, this particular measure will be seen to be oflimited value
unlessthe risk characteristics of thetaxescollected and the net return that
remains are also known. This aggregation problems is not merely of theoretical—2—
interest. Current methods of capital income taxation impose markedly different
relative tax burdens on any given asset in different states of nature, because
of such characteristics as imperfect loss offsets and ndsmeasurement (often
intentional)of economic depreciation.
Finally, the question of whether asset returns are taxed efficiently reduces
toone concerning the optimal taxation of the underlying state—contingent
returns themselves. Just as in the certainty case, Ramsey rules may be derived
for the taxation of different commodities under uncertainty. While these tax
rates should be different across the states, in general, the conditions required
for the optimality of uniform taxation and the direction of divergence when such
conditions are not met have a special interpretation when applied to the taxa—
tion of risky claims. Not surprisingly, these results are closely related to
those of the earlier literature on taxation and risk—taking. However, the pre-
sent analysis explores not how taxes affect risk—taking, but how they should
affect risk—taking, from an efficiency perspective.
In the next section of the paper, we discuss the optimal taxation of risky
assets and the state—contingent claims of which they are composed. Section III
explores the problem of calculating a meaningful tlveffectiveu tax rate for a
risky asset when its underlying returns are taxed at rates differing across
states, and points out the difficulties involved in using expected or "average"
tax rates. In Section IV, we apply this analysis to a tax system resembling
that of the U.S. to determine the biases involved in the use of expected tax
rates.—3—
II.Optimal Taxation of Risky Assets
1any contributions to the literature on taxation and risk—taking have uti
lized the fact that risky assets are, themselves, bundles of contingent
commodities, in applying standard results from the theory of demand (see, for
example, Fischer 1912, Diamond and Yaari 1972, and Sandmo 1917). Fromthis
perspective, the portfolio choice problem maybeseen simplyasa choice among
theunderlying contingent claims subject to a budget constraint. When the
number ofassets is not sufficient to allow purchase of all state—contingent
claims independently,the consumer faces the additional constraint of having to
choose among bundles in the commodity subspace spanned by existing assets. Such
analysis assumes, either explicitly or implicitly, that competitive trading
exists for all risky assets. In such a case, the resulting allocation of
societal risk, subject to the constraints imposed by the incomplete spanning of
the entire comodity space, is Pareto optimal (Diamond 1961).
We may approach the optimal tax problem for risky assets from this same
perspective. For simplicity, we assume that the entire space of contingent
claims is spanned by existing assets. A more general treatment would relax this
restriction, but would lead to a difficulty with the usual fixed revenue
constraint assumption. For example, if there were three uncertain states and
two assets offering combinations of returns in these states, arbitrary corn—
binations of receipts in the different states could not normally be achieved
without raising an excess amount of revenue in at least one state; this addi-
tional welfare cost should be accounted for.It then would be preferable to
allow explicitly for the societal preferences for public expenditures (as in— —
Atkinsonand Stern 197k) and choose the level of public output in the different
states along with the optimal taxes, subject to the spanning constraints.
Consider a simple two—period two—state model in which the representative
individual is endowed with I units of labor in period 1, out of which he can
consume leisure, or work and purchase assets that provide different combinations
of returns, which are consumed in the two states in period 2. The individual's
optimization problem is
(1) maximize w(C0, C1, C2) such that p1C1 p2C2 =(I-C0)
where C0, C1 and C2 are first period leisure and consumption in each of the
second period states, and P1 and P2 are the implicit prices, in terms of labor,
faced by the consumer for the state—contingent claims C1 and C2, derived from
the prices of assets used in combination to obtain returns in the two states.
It is possible to restrict the form of the general utility function w() by
adopting the Van Nèuznann—Morgenstern axioms that iniplyexpectedutility
maximization. We return to this point below.
Let the indirect utility function that results from (1) be v(p1, P2' I),and
suppose that the government wishs to raise revenue sufficient to acquire the
vector S =(s0,S1, s) of the three commodities using taxes on C1 and on
If we let q1 and q2 b the producer prices for C1 and C, and R =
S0+q1S1+q232be the revenue required to purchase the bundle 5, then the
government's optimal tax problem may be written:—5—
(2) maximize v(p1, p2, I) such that + O2p2C2 =R
Since the same optimal tax formula results whether we assume a constant returns
to scale production function (as in Diamond and Mirrlees 1971) or simply that
producer prices are fixed, we make the latter assumption for the sake of
simplicity.
The first order conditions with respect to t1 and t2 may be combined to
yield the familar ratio:
() = l22l_+
£12+ £21 + £10
where is the compensated elasticity of demand for good i with respect to
price j.
The formula in (3) is no different from that for any three—good optimal tax
problem in the absence of uncertainty. However, more may be learned if we




where and 2 are the subjective probabilities the consumer assigns to states
1 and 2.
So1vinfor and €() ,weobtain:
1 2 j ji
(1u2) (2IJ2) dlog(U2/U2)




where A is the determinant of the bordered Hessian, which must be negative, U' =
u(c0,ci), U is the partial derivative of Ui with respect to its jthargument,—6—
andUjk is the second partial derivative of U1 with respect to its th and
kth arguments. From a comparison of (3) and (5),itis apparent that there are
two factors that might lead to differential taxes on C1 and C2, corresponding to
the two terms in brackets in (5). The tax on C1, &-,willbe greater than that
o C2, 02, to the extent that
1 2
U) C1 U- C





Each of these effects has an intuitive interpretation. The second is the
derivative of the logarithm of the marginal rate of substitution between C1 and
C2 with respect to C0.-'1 If it exceeds zero, then an increase in the consump-
tion of C0 increases the marginal valuation of C1 relative to C2.
If the marginal rate of substitution between C1 and C2 is unaffected by the
level of C0, then the function w() is, by definition, weakly separable into
goods and leisure; that is,
('r) W(CQ,C1,C2) F(C0,(C1,C2))
for some welt—behaved functions F and .However,by ()4), thisweak separabi—
lity implles strong separability, so that expected utility takes the form:
() w(c0,C1,C2)=1111U1(C0)+u11(c1)1+2Iu1(c0)+
= u1(c0)+ir1U11(c1) + ir2U11(02)
where u1() and u11() are the utility subfunctions that apply to consumption in—7—
periods 1 and 2, respectively. This intertemporal separability is a common
assumption in the literature.
In this case, equation (6.a) can be rewritten
(8) —( >(UII(02)02 )
whichsays that the tax on returns in state 1 should be higher than those in
state 2 if and only if the degree of relative risk aversion (Arrow 1965) is
higher in state 1 than in state 2, given the commodity bundle (C1, 02) that is
being purchased. The intuitive explanation for this result is that as indivi-
duals become more risk averse, their behavior becomes more inelastic; hence, a
tax is less distortionary.
The implications of this result for the taxation of risky assets depends on
how such assets difer in their combination of returns in the two states as they
get "riskier", and whether individuals display constant, decreasing or
increasing relative risk aversion. Arrowhasargued that relative risk aversion
ought to be constant or increasing with respect to wealth. If relative risk
aversion is constant, then from (8) it follows that uniform taxation is optimal.
This is unsurprising for two reasons, Most directly, since u11(c) must take the
form
a +B(L_)
where y is the degree of relative risk aversion, the function i1U11(C1) +
ishomogenous in C and 2• Thus, the function w() satisfies the—8—
condition of weak, hornothetic separability that is sufficient for the optimality
of uniform taxation (Sandmo 19T4, Auerbach 1919). In addition, because of the
separation of portfolio and savings decisions present under constant relative
risk aversion (Merton 1969, Samuelson 1969), it makes sense that a "second—best"
distortion of portfolio choice would not help offset the overall disincentive to
save introduced by the uniform taxation of savings.
If individuals display increasing relative risk aversion, then the degree of'
relative risk aversion, and hence the optimal tax rate, will be higher in the
state with a higher level of consumption. In a two—state model, this corresponds
to the "good" state when returns are high in the aggregate. However, taxes
typically would be applied to asset returns rather than state—contingent
commodities, so itisimportant to know what this result implies for the taxa-
tion of the risky assets themselves.
Suppose there are two assets, A and B, that span the two states of the
i i
world.If rA arid rB are the returns per dollar of investment in state i, then
by solving the system ofequations
11 i
rAr13 XA 6.1
(9) 22 i = (1=1,2)
rA rB XB 612
where =0for I jand1for i =3, weobtain the amount of each asset,
XA and XB, that must be purchased to get a unit return in state i, as well as
the implicit prices of such returns,—9—
(10) =x
+xB (i=l,2)
Itis then easy to solve for the tax on returns to asset A and that on
returns to asset B that together yield the desired taxes on the state—contingent
returns.(In fact, there are an infinite number of other solutions to this
transformation problem if we allow tax rates to differ not only across assets
but also across states for a given asset, for then there are four, rather than
two instruments available.) If we let the state—contingent taxes be 1 and 02,
as above, and the taxes on asset returns be tA and tB, then the asset com-
bination needed to achieve a unit return in state i in the presence of taxes,





(12) (y +y)(l_01) =x+ (i=l,2)
IiI
Together,(11) and (12) represent six equations in the unknowns tA tB, 'B'
I i 11
and y, given thepositedvalues ofarid 02 and the values of XA, XB,
2 2
andX13 obtained from (9).Solvingfor tA and tB yields:
(1—tB)—10—
121 211











.Combinationof (13a) and (13b) yields:
tAtB 1 01_02 1 12 2 (in)
(1-tA)(1-tB)
=10')(1[(rA-rB)(rB-rA)J
Sincein equilibrium there can be no stochastic dominance of one asset over
another, the last term on the right—hand side of (114) is positive. Thus,
(15) sgn (tA—tB) =sgn(1') x sgn( Oj 02)
The sign of the determinant rdependson which asset is relatively intensive
instate 1.If it is asset A, then r >üand sign (tA—tB) =sgn(01—02).
Similarly, if B is relatively intensive in state 1, I'<Oandsgn (tB—tA) =sgn
Q1_02). In both cases, the tax should he highest on that asset relatively
intensive in the state we wish to taxmoreheavily. Under intertemporal separa-
bility ofutility and increasing relative risk aversion, this is the statein
which consumption is greater,the"good" state. Therefore, the asset to be
taxed more heavily is the one yielding a greater fraction of its return in the
good state; by anycommondefinition, this is the riskier of the two assets.























riskiess and that asset B yields a higher return in state 1. Thus, if there are
positive quantities of both assets, the market return is higher in state 1 than
in state 2. The two budget lines depict the returns possible per dollar of'mi—
tial investment, before and after tax. A higher tax rate on purchases of'state
1 claims is accomplished by placing a higher tax on returns to asset B,
(1—OB'/OB), than on the the riskiess return, (l—OA'/OA). As stated above, the
sameoutcome would he achieved in a number of waysthrough the use of state—
dependent tax rates on the two assets.For example, a shift in the return per
dollar invested in asset B from point B to B", rather than to B', would yield
the samepost—tax budget line. Asdepicted, this would involve taxing the
return to asset B more heavily in state 1 than in state 2.
Thus, under familar restrictions on the nature of individual preferences, it
appears that heavier taxation of the return to risky assets may be appropriate.
However, though it would be straightforward to extend the analysis to consider
several states of nature, the model is still a very simple one; it would be
unwise to draw general conclusions about the optimal tax treament of risk. In
particular, the assumption of complete markets is rather extreme, in light of
the existence of such important nontraded risks as those associated with human
capital. Nevertheless, theanalysisdoes suggest that differential taxation of
assetsmay be optirnil.—13—
III. Calculating the Tax Rate on Risky Assets
The previous section was devoted to the derivation of the optimal propor-
tional tax rates on risky assets. However, it was pointed out, in passing, that
an infinite number of combinations of state—dependent tax rates on each asset
also yield the results desired. For example, a proportional tax that brought
the after—tax return on asset B to point B' in Figure 1 would have the same
effect on consumer choice as a nonproportional tax, heavier in state 1, that
brought the after—tax return to B". As pointed out in the introduction, "real
world" tax systems typically do not impose on a given asset the same fractional
tax burden in each state of nature, due to mismeasurement of income. Thus, in
the derivttion of a single "the" tax rate on an asset, the choice of' weights
used in aggregating tax rates across states is important; there are certain cri-
teria such a choice of weights would satisfy. For example, the tax rate on
asset B in Figure 1 should be the same whether the post—tax bundle is B' or B".
One measure that might be suggested is the expected tax rate, defined as the
fraction of an asset's gross return the government expects to collect. Aside
from having a straightforward interpretation, this measure also lends itself to
empirical use. By examining the returns over time of a risky asset, and
assuming that they are drawn from the same distribution, one can take average
grossand net returns and calculate the sample mean of the annual tax rates to
obtain an estimate of the expected tax rate.
However,the expected tax rate can be a seriously misleading estimate of the-l4 -
realtax burden imposed on an asset. This point is perhaps most easily
recognized if one considers a tax that has no real effects at all. As recently
pointed out by Gordon (1981) ,Fatax on risky assets of that portion of the
return that exceeds the risk—free rate is completely non—distortionary, and has
no effect on the investor's consumption possibilities. This may be seen as an
extension of Tobin's (1958) result, which was based on the assumption of a zero
safe return. Such a tax is depicted in Figure 2, where the return to asset A is
unaffected and that to asset B is moved toward A along the original budget line,
to B*, by the fraction of tax on B's excess return.' Such a result would occur
if there were no personal taxes and a corporation facing an income tax financed
all its investment by the issuance of interest—free debt, with interest payments
tax deductible.
To calculate the expected tax rate on asset B, we calculate the change in
its expected return resulting from taxation. If i and 2 are the probabilities
attached to states 1 and 2,-" then the expected return on asset B before tax
equals r5, as depicted in Figure 2. The bundle B =(rB,rB) lies along the
same expected return line as the original bundle. That such a line has a
steeper slope than the budget line itself is a condition necessary for
equilibrium.-"Another way of stating this condition is that the risky asset
must carry apositiverisk premium.
The post—tax expected yield on asset B is r* and the expected tax rate is
therefore Ll_(B*)/(FB)]. Clearly, this is a misleading measure. The error

















rather than the actual implicit prices for goods in the two states. It would be
as if the governement "taxed" a bundle of apples and oranges by purchasing
cheaper apples with costlier oranges, at market prices. The value of the bundle
would be unaffected, but the number of pieces of fruit would decline. In a
similar way, the government exchanges state 1 returns for the scarcer, more
expensive (relative to expectations) state 2 returns. This difficulty does not
arise when the tax rate on an asset is constant across the states, for then any
weighting scheme wilt do.
This result suggests that a more logical way of calculating effective tax
rates is to measure the value of resources extracted by comparing the lines with
the slopes of the new budget line running through the before and after tax
return bundle for each particular asset.1I' An example is shown in Figure 3,
where it is assumed that A is not taxed and B is taxed only in state 1, the good
state. We measure the effective tax rate on asset B by comparing the distance
from the origin of the new budget line and that line parallel to it passing
through the original bundle B. This measure will be the same along any ray
from the origin, but is perhaps clearest intuitively if we use the 45° line and
project onto either axis. The effective tax rate would then be (rB—rA)/rB0,
which compares the risk—free components of the before-tax and after-tax bundles.
By insisting that the bundles compared lie along the same ray, we avoid con—
fusing changes in risk characteristics with changes in tax burden. Putting
every LI! ingin risk—:idj ustedterms seems the most naturat method of doing this.
This"risk—adjustedeffective tax rate" (henceforth referred to as RET) hasState 2
—17—
Figure 3
Calculation of Risk—AdjustedEffective Tax Rates
State 1
p1







certain desirable properties. First of all, any time the tax burden is uniform
across states of nature, the pre—tax and post—tax budget lines are parallel.
Thus, the BETs on assets A and B will be equal. In particular, for the special
case depicted in Figure 2, the RET on both assets is appropriately measured as
zero. A second characteristic of the RET is that any shift in post—tax returns
that leaves the post—tax budget line unaffected, such as a movement of the post—
tax return on asset B from 13' to B" in Figure 1,alsoleaves unaffected the RET
on each asset. Finally, when taxation of state—contingent commodities is not
uniform, the RETmustbe higher on that asset which is relatively intensive in
the more highly taxed state.
However, knowledge of the RETs on different assets is not sufficient for
determination of the overall tax burden faced by the investor, as measured by
the exact tax burden in each state. This is because the post—tax and pre—tax
budget lines may be the same in two cases, yet the RETs may differ if the ini-
tial bundles differ, as seen in Figure 3 by comparing the RET starting from
point B rather than B.
Thus, in using the RET, we can say which assets are taxed more heavily, but
have no unambiguous measure of the differential tax between assets.
Nevertheless, itremainsa useful statistic intellingus how the tax system is
biasedwith respect to different assets. It can be useful, therefore, in com-
paring anexistingtaxsystemwith one dictated byoptimaltax considerations
likethose discussed above, where a heavier tax burden on riskier assets may be
appropriate.—19—
IV. An Application
flather than fully describing an asset in terms of its returns across states
of nature, we may also characterize it in terms of how much its expected return
exceeds its risk—adjusted return. This may be done for the return on an asset
as a whole or for various components separately. For example, suppose an asset
receives a post—tax cash flow, x, plus some certain depreciation allowance, y,
as depicted in Figure 4.Noadjustment need be madetothe latter's expected
value. However, theexpectedcash flow, x, exceeds its value at post—tax
prices, x°. We may summarize this by defining a discount rate P such that
(15) =l+p l+i
where i is the post—tax risk—free return.p is the discount rate that, when
applied to the expected return x, gives the correct value of the uncertain
return x. The total value of'theasset's return x+y would be
l+pl+i
Touse this approach in a nultiperiod setting is complicated unless we have
some form of stationarity which allows us to examine each period independently.
Therefore,let us considera modelwhere such stationarity obtains. We assume
assets depreciate exponentially. In each period, the gross return to dollar of
capital of type j is r and the rate of physical decay is d. Both r and
dj are independent and identically distributed over time. Thus, for a dollar
invested,thegrossreturn at the end ofthe period is r —plus a certain-20-
Figure 4
Calculation of Discount Rates
State 2
////
X— — — — — — — slope—




return of the original dollar. Once depreciated capital has been replaced,-1
the asset is identical in all respects one period hence and nist have tL
value.
To maintain this stationarity in the presence of taxes, we must assume
unrealistically that all assets of a particular type j, whatever their age, are
allowed the same (possibly stochastic) depreciation per dollar of capital,,
fortax purposes, as well as the same physical depreciation, d. We assume new
assets receive an investment tax credit equal to TAJ,' and that taxable profits
face a proportional tax at rate T.
Thus, an investment of one dollar yields an immediate credit of value TX
and, one period hence, a gross return r(l—T) in after tax flows, less depre-
ciation plus depreciation deductions TcL plus an investment tax credit on
replacement investment, TAd. At the end of the period the asset itself,
including replacement, is still worth l—rX, the value of the initial net
investment. If we let p, and be the discount rates appropriate for the
expected values of and a. then it follows, by construction, that the
adjusted return to the one dollar of capital (which costs (l—TA)) is
.(1-T)i.(i-TX.. f&. (16) (L - +
J(l+i)
l+pj l+ó
Since in equilibriumall assetsmustyield the sameadjusted return after tax,
this must, in turn, equal (l—TX)i. That is, the risk—adjusted return after tax
to this investment of (i—tA) is i, the post—tax risk—free return. Rewriting-22--
(16),we havethepost—tax, risk—adjusted return on asset j: .(i—r)(l+i). (i+i) ii, (i+i)
(17) _____ -____- + =
(1—TA)(1+P)l+ (i—tA)(i+i)
To obtain the RETonasset j,wesimply construct the risk—adjusted gross of tax









(19) = )_____-_3 3
— — r —d
(i÷) 7i--o)
For a number of special cases, expression (19) becomes quite simple:
Ci)ng:Here, A and 0, so 0.
(2) Economic Depreciation: Here, X =0,cz =dand hence =
Thus,cYj =T.
(3) First—Year ystern: Asin Auerbach and Jorgenson (1980) ,theidea is to




which equals the present value of flows of future economic
depreciation)"
Typically, the tax system satisfies none of these simple cases. Except for
inflation risk, depreciation allowances are certain. With econoniic depreciation






The effective tax rate will be higher or lower than T depending on whether
depreciation carries a discount rate less than or greater than i.
In comparison to the risk—adjusted effective tax rate, the simple expected
tax rate on asset j is:
(22) =
J 1—tx. —
r—dwhich will be the same in general if and only if the tax is proportional
(expensing or economic depreciation) or all components of the net return possess
the same characteristics. Even in so simple a case as the first year system,











Thus,riskier assets large)or rapidly depreciating assets (large)would
appear to be taxed at lower rates, even though o =rfor all assets and the
underlying state—contingent commodities are taxed equally.
Thus, if one knows the values of the discount rates p, 6, and for each
asset, as well as the expected values of d and calculation of a useful
effective tax rate is possible (leaving aside how the above analysis can be
extended to a more complicated tax system). Without such information, one might
still avoid use of the expected tax rate by calculating the effective tax rate
for hypothetical riskiess assets with the same values of d, and But—25-
these will generally differ from those of the actual assets, which are risky.
Without a proportional tax system, it will not generally be possible to infer
anything about the tax rates on risky assets without actually making assumptions
about the risk characteristics of such assets.-26—
V. Conclusion
The foregoing analysis has shown that it needn't be optimal to tax the
returns to different assets at the same rat.e.Indeed, it may be optimal to tax
risky assets more heavily than safe assets, if individuals possess increasing
relative risk aversion. However, a comparison of any particular tax system,
current or proposed, is difficult when the taxation of individual assets varies
across states. The use of expected tax rates in such cases can be seriously
misleading, not only in theory, but in practice as well, as theexamplein sec-
tion IV demonstrates. A proposed alternative measure, the "risk—adjusted effec-
tive tax rate," performs better, but cannot be computed without more extensive
knowledge of an asset's risk characteristics.—27—
Footnotes
1The tax on first period labor supply, (1—co), may be set equal to zero with
no loss of generality since equiproportional taxes on C1, C2, and (I—c0)
have no real effects.
2This term appears in the analysis by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) of the
optimal non—linear tax on labor income with a heterogenous population. In
that context, only this term enters into the determination of whether com-
modity taxes should be different.
3See also thediscussionin Mintz (1981)
This involves a subsidy in state 2.
5 Weignore issues arising if individuals have different or incorrect subjec-
tive evaluations of and
6Withexpected utility maximization, (1u11t(c1)/2u11'(c2)) =(p1/p2).
Since C1 >C2, >(p1/p2).
7' Asimilar measure could be constructed using the before—tax budget line and
a line of equal slope running through the post—tax bundle.
8Itis merely a convenience to assume that such replacement actually occurs.
9Thismay also be thought of as an initial deduction equal to a fraction
of the asset's purchase price.
10 •This can be seen as the summation of the infinite series:
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